The problem of absenteeism has taken the centre of the stage of public attention when Renato Brunetta, the Public Employment Secretary, launched a reform of the public sector which started with a law on absenteeism. After the law was passed, the first evidence collected showed an average drop of 47% in sickness absence. This result was received with scepticism, but now we have enough evidence and research to draw some firm conclusions. This paper plans to investigate the effects of the Law 133/2008 and the shocks occurred after the changes in the law itself. We will study how employees characteristics in the private and public sector are related to absentee behaviour. The relationship between individual characteristics, such as wage, gender, age, tenure, education and the labor-leisure decision made by workers will be estimated in a micro-data model. The data come from a panel of individuals working in a large private company, operating all over Italy in the security sector, and one public sector institution,(AE) the tax collection Agency. The results indicate a remarkable direct and indirect reaction to the law in the public and also private sectors.
Motivation
The reform launched by Public Employment Secretary Renato Brunetta stirred a very lively debate even before the Law 133/2008 was passed. The Italian public employment inefficiency and shirking attitude was so legendary that the government action became the target of attacks and praise. After the law was passed, the first evidence showed an average drop of 41% in total sickness absence in the second semester 2008, according to Ministry data. This result was received with scepticism but the evidence that has been collected in the last two years 1 now confirms remarkable direct reaction to the law in the public sector and, what is more surprising, an equally strong reaction in the private sector. The cost of opportunistic behaviour in the Italian private sector may be a job loss or slower/no career. If an employee's higher sick rate increases the risk of job loss, higher unemployment rate cuts, the propensity to report sick, the most absence-prone workers are more likely to be laid off (Leigh, 1985) . In downturns, the employees' absence rate falls as we find in our private company. In the public company, the cost of opportunistic behaviour is a reduction of earnings to the base salary -no bonus and allowances-for the first 10 days and an increased risk of being caught by stricter doctor's inspection and certificate policy. The employment protection legislation in Italy restricts the hiring and firing of workers but much more in the public than in the private sector. The Labour Protection Law restricts the firing public employees. This rule must be followed within groups of employees defined by negotiations between employers and unions. The seniority-based lay-off rule makes the public sector a very stable employment protected from the business cycle. If the reduction in sick leave is due to changes in economic incentives there is scope for a policy aimed at altering economic incentives. Following the evidence of decline, we describe the absenteeism path of the employees of a public institution and a private company before and after July 2008, when Law 133/2008 has been enforced, and after August 2009, when the law has been amended. We then estimate the relationship of sickness absence with workers' demographic and professional characteristics, both using the panel dimension, and the separate cross sections in 2007, 2008 and 2009 . In this section we discuss some descriptive background data on long run trends that we take from different Italian macro databases to check the DPE results. We then proceed to Section 2 where we summarize the factors affecting absenteeism behavior, according to the existing literature, and the main features of Law 133/2008. Section 3 illustrates our empirical analysis using data from a large public sector and a private company in the service sector. Section 4 concludes.
Characteristics of the data and Sample selection
In Italy the long run trends in sick leave in public and private sectors before Law 133 were recorded by Istituto nazionale di statistica (ISTAT), Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (RGS), the Budget Agency of Ministry of Economics and Finance. Contingent on the Law 133, the Department of Public Employment (DPE) decided to monitor working time of employees to construct a database on absenteeism. The aim of this collection is forming a monthly census about working and absence days or hours for all employees of every public institution at the local and national level. These are the first data addressing directly the problem of sick leave in the public sector at a monthly frequency. It complements existing datasets like ISTAT Labor Force Survey (based on a questionnaire asking the employee if he or she has worked less than normal during a reference week 2 ) and RGS which is an administrative yearly record covering all public institutions. To the Committee formed by the Secretary of Public Employment, Agenzia delle Entrate (AE) the tax collecting Agency of the Government and INPS, the National Institute of Social Security and Pensions contributed with their micro datasets. Two large public institutions employing respectively 34283 and 29434 workers in 2009, monitor their employees each month, but INPS also monitors the workers of the entire private sector. Since the Department of Public Employment (DPE) started monitoring in September 2007, more than 50% of public employment has entered the database. As of February 2010 it is 53,3%. The rate of response is higher in the Northwest 63,2% than in the Northeast, 62,5%, Centre 47.3% and 39,3% in the South. The sample may have suffered from selection bias at the beginning provided that only "virtuous" institutions might have promptly answered the Secretary's call (see Lavoce.info Giulio Zanella, 2008) . But the coverage is now wide both in quantitative terms and geographically, and by the type of administrative service provided (see Appendix 2). One way to check the quality of these data is to compare them with RGS data, which publishes administrative data for semesters and years independently from the Ministry of Public Administration. Aggregating by semesters, DPE public employees sickness figures recorded in the second semester 2008, immediately after Law 133, an unprecedented fall of 41.4% or -2.9 days per employee with respect to the previous semester. Using RGS data, the reduction is -45.2%, 3 days less, on average. If we compare DPE data with AE and INPS micro datasets we have very similar results. Table 1 (first panel) reports the percentage variation in the number of total sickness absence days in the first and second semester 2008 (before and after the enforcement of Law 133). The second line reports the variation of absence days per worker. Second panel shows the percentage variation between IV quarter 2008 and IV quarter 2007 to account for seasonality 3 .
2 Using ISTAT data on sickness absence incidence rates in the public and private sectors in Italy I2004-II2009, D'Amuri (2010) finds that Law 133/2008 reduced absence rates by 27 per cent. This reduction amounts to an increase of 10.6 million in worked days, 1.4 per cent of total workable days The public/private sector wedge in absence rates, conditional on observables, initially the highest 68% in OECD country decreases from 45.6 to 6.9 per cent in the evaluation period. 
Law 133/2008
In the Italian Public Administration, before Law 133/2008, different contracts regulated sickness absence for the various Government Agencies. There were strong pressures to introduce a general reform of the PA to increase its productivity, and the starting point was inducing workers to lower their absence rates. Law 133/2008, enforced in July 2008, introduced the following novelties: 1. workers receive only base salary for the first 10 days of sickness absence. The reform reduces replacement ratio to 80%-90% from 100% after the 16 th day. Average daily cost of absence varies with the share of base on total salary across public institution/contracts. INPS1 average cost is 16 euro per day, for instance. If we split by qualification: blue collar 9 euro, white collar 16 euro a day, manager 48 euro. It is 6.5 euro in a public educational institution (De Paola Maria, 2008) . For AE in 2009, the cost of a sickness day for white collars is 14 euro, for middle managers is 18 euro, directors: 70 euro. The base salary per day per weighted qualification is for white collars 54 euro, middle managers 63 euro (not available info for managers). 2. new law targets the potentially corrupt relations between employees and their personal doctors: only official public institution doctors, may produce medical certifications. 3. sanctions for false certificates are made more severe for both the physicians and worker. From a civil to a criminal infringement. 4. daily interval to receive medical inspections at home are extended. INPS or ASL doctors before the Law 133 could inspect without notice from 10 to 12 am and from 5 to 7 pm every working day. After the Law 133, the time span has been extended to the day, with a one hour break at 1-2 pm, and during the weekend as well. In August 2009 this last article had been emended by the Parliament, and the previous regime has been to some extent re-established going back to narrower daily intervals for inspection. In the private sector the law for sickness leaves has not been changed and is regulated differently: 1. sickness benefits replace worker's wage for maximum 180 days. The first 3 days of absence are paid by one's own employer. From the 4 th to 20 th day, 50% of the wage is replaced by INPS and 50% still paid by the employer. From the 21 st day to 180 th , 66,66% of the wage is paid by INPS and 33,34% is paid by the employers. Therefore, frequent short leaves and 20 day spells are particularly expensive for employers.
2. Primary care physician certifies but sanctions for false certificates are much harder like in the public sector. From a civil to a criminal infringement. The only novelty is that the doctor should send directly the sickness certificates online to INPS. 3. INPS or ASL doctors may conclude home visits from 10 to 12 am and 5 to 7 pm every working day, not over weekends. The new Law affects the private sector only in relation to point 2) so we can assume that there is an effect of Law 133 also on workers of the private sector. We capture this side effect by checking for a potential behavioural change in absence rates after the third quarter of 2009 in the private sector companies, when the Law was amended.
What factors affect absenteeism?
The international literature on absenteeism is very rich. Sickness absence has been studied in every aspect and country especially in those where reforms have tried to reduce it. In Italy there is no tradition of such studies: the literature starts in the latest decade and consists of about 10 papers. But recent work has followed the law and tried to measure its impact (De Paola Maria, 2008 , De Paola Maria et al., 2009 , Scoppa Vincenzo, 2008 and new work will be made possible by the team working within the Department of Public Employment 4 . New datasets have been generated so that Italian statistics on sickness absence will be studied also for international comparison. The bulk of the international literature follows an almost exclusively supply-side approach, until 1990. Later on the focus shifts on the demand side. As an example, Barmby, Orme and Treble (1995, 2002) concentrate on contractual structure and on monitoring devices used by companies. The international literature in general finds that high sickness absence is related to such economic features as high labour market participation, the share of women and older people, contractual arrangements, economic cycle and a generous insurance scheme which can increase moral hazard. It is also related to the cultural features of the individuals. Let us summarize the main findings of the literature according to the main determinants : 1) Institutions, sickness benefits and insurance have a direct and significant impact: it has been estimated that around 10% reduction in net wage coverage in Sweden would reduce the absence rate by 1,2% (Johansson and Palme, 2002, Henrekson and Persson, 2004) 5 . If insurance costs are mainly borne by the government, as in most European countries, significant fiscal costs arise. The government, the employers or both provide employees with insurance against this loss of income. Income protection works the other way around: employment protection and unemployment insurance reduce the expected cost of work absence to the individual employee (Ichino and Riphahan, 2005 , Bonato and Lusinyan, 2007 , Markussen Simen, 2007 , Frick and Malo, 2008 6 , either by making it more difficult to sanction absenteeism or by reducing the effective cost of the sanction. Absence drops when companies pay high sickness insurance. The employers' reaction to absence depends on the costs they have to bear. Employers may have to disburse part or all of the cash benefits received by the absentee or pay contributions to the insurance funds. The more costly absence is to the employers, the more likely they are to respond. In the public sector, where most reforms have taken place, when workers make their absence decisions, face costs of forgone income which depend on the generosity of the insurance system. In the private sector the possibility of sanctions by the employers, range from slow career progression to dismissal, to temporary layoff (CIG in Italy).
2) Contractual agreement and organizational flexibility, measured by the share of part time, temporary and special contracts. Barmby et al. (1995) find that sickness absence responds more to contractual agreements than to workers' characteristics. These results are concentrated in the English literature where long working hours have been found as a relevant factor of absence and reduction in absences was recorded as a consequence of flexible working arrangements. 3) Individual labour force characteristics, the different pattern of women and men in the labour market, but also their genetic and behavioural differences and family work, burden. Health approximated by life expectancy -and the participation rate, reduce absence (Costa G. et al. 2005 , Gimeno D. et al. 2004 . 4) Culture affects propensity to absenteeism. Consider for an example how employee behaviour is influenced by such characteristics as the geographic area of employment, the quality of management, individual background, group interaction effects: if everybody does it why not me? Ichino Andrea e Giovanni Maggi (2000) find that, after controlling for individual and market conditions, in the South of Italy the probability of absenteeism is higher than in the North. 5) Market conditions and the pro-cyclic effect of unemployment gap on absenteeism. The unemployment gap literature is in line with the idea that the market works as a discipline device on the propensity to be absent (Shapiro and Stigliz, 1984) . This action has been found (Bonato and Lusinyan, 2007) less effective where there are strong EPL laws, which can be approximated by the unionization rate. Such policies reduce the company's effectiveness in reducing absence days and end up with a positive impact on absence rate. This is documented for Italy by Riphahn (2004, 2005) . They show that when the probation period ends for the employees of a large bank, absence days start increasing. Markussen (2007) finds low absenteeism in countries where the generosity of the welfare system is at an intermediate level. In the most generous systems strong long run absence prevails (high intensity and low frequency); rigid systems lead to excess short term absence (low intensity and high frequency).
Data description
We study the impact of the Law 133 on the public sector with a dataset from Agenzia delle Entrate (AE), with its 38105 employees. This public institution has subsidiaries everywhere in the country and our information starts in January 2007 and ends in December 2009, in an unbalanced panel of 411946 observations. The balanced panel contains 32,231 individuals with observations in the 12 quarters of the period 2007-2009. Sickness absence episodes are registered by starting day of a month-year and final day of absence. We then know for each day whether the worker has been off or on work. We aggregate the number and duration of episodes by quarters and years.
52.1% of the individuals are women workers, with an average age of 48.3 years old. Both men and women have an average seniority of around 20 years of work. 54.5% of women workers are middle managers and 56.3% of men are middle managers and 4.9% are directors. 1 worker out of 3 works in the Centre of Italy (Rome) or in the South. 59% of men and 65% of women had been involved in some union activity. 78.8% of these workers have experienced at least one episode of sickness absence in a year. The mean duration of a sickness absence in the period under study is 4.4 days per episode, with a standard deviation equal to 11 days. There are few episodes of very high absence duration, but the 95 th percentile of the distribution of days of sickness is equal to 18 days per year.
39.8% of the workers experienced from zero to 3 episodes of sickness absence per year. 40% of the workers have had more than 12 episodes of absence per year. The number of episodes observed is spread over a larger distribution in the public institution compared to the private company, in which 75% of the times we observe maximum 3 episodes of absence (versus 40% in AE).
We define a qualitative state variable for each individual worker measuring the duration and frequency of absence. It is equal to "Low frequency sickness absence" if the individual experienced at most 3 episodes of absence per year. On the contrary, "High frequency sickness absence" refers to individuals with more than 3 episodes of absence. The state variable is equal to "Short duration" if the number of days off work is less than or equal to 5 per episode. "Long duration" if the number of days off work is higher than 5 days in a row. Table 2 shows the distribution of the state variable. 14.11 TOTAL 34.00 66.00 100.00 AE workers prefer to be absent for short periods but with a lot of episodes (this happens 59% of the times across the years). In the private company, workers prefer to take short periods in few episodes per year (38% of the times) but also long periods with high frequency (31%). Common to the two institutions is the presence of a substantial number of "frequent absentees", but AE employs almost twice as many frequent absentees as the private company at hand. Table 4 ). The data for the private sector come from a large Italian company, which provides safety and surveillance services to banks. This company has subsidiaries located in many Northern and Central regions of Italy. We have monthly information about 2821 employees starting in January 2004 until December 2009, in an unbalanced panel. 7 The sample contains 2821 individuals with 10784 total observations. As shown in Table 5 , 86.4% of workers are men and almost 14% are women, who are on average 7 years younger than men. 56.8% of men are married and 38.7% of women are married, while 50% of women are single without children. 57.8% of women workers have a high school degree, 20.4% a junior high degree while around 16% of women do not have or do not indicate an education degree. On the opposite side, men have a high school degree in just 27.1 cases out of 100, most of them have a junior high degree, and 14% of men do not have or indicate any degree. University graduate workers are a small minority (1.8% men and 6.3% women). Table 5 reports two important indicators of workers performance and behaviour, the average annual gross payment and the percentage of extra payment received over a year. Men are paid on average slightly more than women, and they also prefer to work more extra hours, given that they receive on average 7% more extra payment on average than women. Unfortunately we do not have an analogous information on salaries for the public institution. The total sample is made mostly of blue collar men with a junior high degree of education and a low average annual gross salary (unskilledlow paid workers). Sickness absenteeism can be shown along different dimensions 8 . On average, around 36% of the workers do not take any sickness leave, 63.9% of private workers had experienced at least one episode of sickness absenteeism. If we look at the duration of sickness leaves, 30% of the workers stay absent for 1 day, 10% for 4 days and 1% stay away from work more than 10 days, on average. The average duration is 11 days per year with a standard deviation equal to 21 days. Since 2007, the number of absentees has dropped by ca. 2% per year. Notice that the number of workers drops continuously after 2005 (among those most probably many frequent absentees have been laid off). Figure 3 confirms the continuous drop in absence since 2005, measured as total number of days off work per worker each year. It is evident the big drop in absence incidence in 2009. This fact could be due to a bigger presence of "short" spans of absence, while "long" episodes of absence are less observed because of progressive firing of high-frequent absentees in 2005. Alternatively, the drop in absence rates in 2008 and 2009 could be due to a behavioural change (maybe also as a side-effect). This is crucial for our regression results because we compare the public and private companies quarterly, starting in 2007, when the firing process in the private company has been stabilized. As before, we construct the qualitative state variable indicating the duration of absence into two categories, according to whether an individual stays off work for at most 5 days in a row (SHORT leave) or more than 5 days (LONG leave). The reason is that even if in the company under study 5 consecutive days do not form a working week (individuals work on shifts also over the weekend, see note 8), in other sectors they normally do (for example in the public sector). Moreover, few institutions record absenteeism for health reasons only when the sickness leave is at least a week long (INPS for private sector workers). Since episodes of absence vary between zero and 12 (meaning that there might be some worker showing absence for health reasons each month of the year for at least a fraction of a day), most of the sample (75.4%) is characterized by less than 4 episodes per year. Around 30% of the sample take 1 or 2 sickness leaves per year and 36% do not experience any absence for health reasons. As before, three episodes of absence is our threshold choice to distinguish infrequent absentees (with LOW frequency) from frequent absentees (with HIGH frequency) in the state variable. Table  6 illustrates the percentage distribution of the state variable across all years, ignoring state 1. 
Sickness leaves of the private company before and after policy implementation
Since we are interested in comparing private sector workers' behaviour with public sector workers' behaviour in terms of absenteeism for health reasons, we analyse the duration and frequency of our data on sickness leaves in specific time spans, before and after the law was enforced (July 2008). The law is addressed to the public, but it contains new rules on institutional certification of sickness, which we believe can affect private workers behaviour as well. There could be a side effect of the law on the choice of duration and frequency of absence in the private sector, which we are going to explore. We start by calculating the average duration of absence for total sickness and compare the first semester 2008 with first semester 2009. The former is a period in which not only the law had not been approved yet, but the announcement of this change appeared in May 2008 (at the end of the semester). The latter instead is a period in which the law had been enforced and applied. We expect to see a decreasing trend in the public sector, and a slightly decreasing trend in the private sector as well, due to the side effect. Second, we calculate the average duration of absence comparing the second semesters of 2007, 2008, and 2009 . This is a longer span to check for behavioural changes. The law did not exist in the second semester in 2007, while in the second semester 2008 the law was in force in its main form, and in the second semester 2009 it was in force in a slightly amended form (a "lighter" constraint version on the daily time span required to be home for medical inspection). Third, we calculate the average duration of absence across the third quarter in 2008 and 2009, to check for a change after the amendment. We expect a smaller reduction or even an increase in the rate of absenteeism in the public sector, while there should not be a dramatic change in behaviour in the private sector; no side effect should be in force here. We compare similar periods of different years to control for seasonality existing in working hours. The results are summarized in Table 8 . There was a reduction in the episodes of sickness absence between the first semester 2008 and 2009 by 13.7% on average. The reduction showed up across all categories of workers, also for frequent absentees, who reduced their episodes by 3.1% in the same period. Table 9 shows a small decrease along the second semesters of the years for all categories, including the frequent absentees. Finally, there was a decrease of 5.8% in the number of episodes between the third semester 2008 and 2009, on average for all sample individuals. Only younger workers (+0.2%), non manual workers (+1.2%) and those located in the North Western regions (+0.3%) increased the number of episodes after the law was emended. Employees with little education reduced episodes of sickness by 0.2%, employees with high education by 15.5%. Frequent absentees increased the number of episodes across the two quarters by 8.2%. They might be slightly more sensitive to side effects.
Whether workers take short or long sickness leaves and how many times in a year depend obviously on personal health conditions, the type of job -for example night or weekly shifts -but also on individual characteristics and incentives to be present in the workplace, as shown in Table 8 and Table 9 . The former two causes are not registered in the database so we cannot observe them. The latter two are observable, if we consider either gross annual salary or annual payments as an incentive for extra working time. Moreover, we cannot identify hazardous behaviour from real health needs, therefore incentives should be designed in order to minimize moral hazard. Law 133/2008 tries to give these incentives (in terms of punishment) to public sector workers, while just economic incentives should be utilized in the private sector. We observe sickness leaves which include hazardous behaviour. Next subsection illustrates the econometric framework used to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy. Policy evaluation is possible provided that before the enforcement both private and public sector workers do not anticipate the possible consequences by inducing them to modify their labor/leisure choice. It is important that the private company firing strategy is not in force during the treatment, to obtain "pure" estimates of the public policy effects. 
Econometric framework
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy, we assume the public enterprise workers are being "treated" by the policy ("treatment"), while the private company workers are used as our "control" group, since the Law has not targeted them. Therefore, we use a difference-in-differences method of estimation, using the private service firm as a control group. The general specification, with T = 12 time periods (quarters), unbalanced, and a known treatment pattern w it , is the following (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008, Imbens and Wooldridge 2007) :
(1) t = 1…T, which accounts for aggregate time effects and allows for a vector of controls x it .
9 The dependent variable is the log-number of days off work for health reasons in a quarter. 10 The indicator w it = 1 when the individual belongs to the treatment group, that is the public sector company, the only one hit by the policy, starting with the third quarter 2008. It is zero before the Law 133 had been enforced -in the third quarter 2008, and it is zero for the workers of the private company (the control group) at any time. To account for specific unobserved c i is standard, provided the policy indicator w it is strictly exogenous: it is quite plausible that correlation between our treatment w it and u ir (that represents shocks to the economy or particularly high peaks of epidemic periods or intensive moral hazard) for any t and r is, i.e. 0 ) , ( = it it u w Cov . Strict exogeneity can be violated if policy assignment changes in reaction to past outcomes on y it and this is not our case. In cases where w it = 1 whenever w ir = 1 for r<t, strict exogeneity is usually a reasonable assumption (i.e. the policy affects all individuals in the public sector over time no matter what). The estimates of τ (the average effect of the treatment) is performed consistently through an OLS estimator, 11 with robust variance (also including a cluster of Public and Private workers) and is equivalent to estimate
where I(·) is the unit function. The estimate is roughly equal to 
where "y-bar" indicates the predictor of the log-number of days of sickness conditional on belonging to the treatment group after and before the law, or to the private company after or before the enforcement of the law.
A number of robustness check are performed over the estimates. The following procedure is implemented: 1. we produce simple OLS estimates of the coefficients as a benchmark model (typical in the DD method) on the whole sample. 2. We estimate the model through a Random Effects estimator to take the panel dimension into account. 3. we test for autocorrelation in the residuals assuming u it an AR(1) process for each individual i (see Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan, 2004) . 4. we test for different effects of the policy over time by including in the specification the interactions of the quarterly dummies and the treatment. The explanatory variables are the socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex, marital status, birthplace area) plus professional characteristics of the workers (in-firm experience, position, location of the workplace, unionization). We also would like to include the percentage of total payment for extra working hours over total salary, which is our incentive variable, but this information is available only for the control group.
10 Given the asymmetric distribution of number of days of generic sickness on the right, there is almost 40% of the sample with zero number of days. To take zeros into account, we rescale the dependent variable to be equal to
11 Standard errors are adjusted to take heterogeneity into account. 12 we estimate separately model (1) also by first differencing to get rid of specific effects c i . We use quarter-to-quarter differences as well as annual differences by taking long differences (4 quarters). The specification with first differences becomes
where t η is a new set of time dummies. We use OLS to estimate FD 5. we apply the same estimation procedure plus robustness checks 1-3 also to the balanced panel of individuals observed over the entire period (I2007-IV2009). This is particularly important for the private sector company, because we avoid the possible distortion of having in the data frequently high absentees who had been caught and fired. The presence of these workers, however threatened by firing, makes the company behaviour in terms of sickness absence similar to the workers in the public sector (see Figure 5 ).
To take time effects into account we add quarterly dummies in all the regressions (including first differences). The results are shown in Table 10 . As said in the introduction, the cost of opportunistic behaviour in the Italian private sector may be a job loss or slower/no carrier. If an employee's higher sick rate increases the risk of job loss, higher unemployment rate cuts, the propensity to report sick, the most absence-prone workers are more likely to be laid off. In downturns, the employees' absence rate falls. Which is what we find in our private company. In the public company, the cost of opportunistic behaviour is a reduction of earnings to the base salary. The employment protection legislation in Italy restricts the hiring and firing of workers but much more in the public than in the private sector. The seniority-based lay-off rule makes the public sector a very stable employment protected by the business cycle.
If the reduction in sick leave is due to changes in economic incentives, then there is scope for policy aimed at altering economic incentives. We are to evaluate whether Law 133/2008 has been an effective incentive.
In all the regressions (including the robustness checks) the average effect of the Policy on public workers number of days of sickness absence, after the III quarter 2008, is negative and statistically significant. The OLS policy estimate in the III quarter 2008 is equal to -0.106 (st. err. 0.0125) for the unbalanced panel and -0.127 (st. err. 0.014) for the balanced panel (see Table 10 and Table 11 , first column). The impact estimated through Random effects is equal to -0.129 (st. err. 0.0141), in column 2 of Table 10 and -0.153 (st. err. 0.015) for the balanced panel.
The size of the effect is a decrease of roughly 1 day per worker of sickness absence in the public institution, compared to the path of the private company workers.
Very importantly, when interacting the treatment dummy with time dummies to check for possible different effects of the policy over time, the estimate of the average treatment in the III quarter 2008 goes up to -0.169 for the unbalanced panel and -0.21 for the balanced panel. The other interactions are basically zero until II quarter 2009, meaning that the law continues to have the same negative average effect. In the III quarter 2009 the Law was amended in the article regulating the time interval of the day when a doctor can visit a patient at home (see Appendix 1). The time interval has been restricted as it was before the Law. We expected this amendment to affect positively absence behaviour, by relaxing it, and this is confirmed by our estimates. It appears that for the balanced panel the average treatment is higher than for the unbalanced panel. This reinforce the idea that the policy had an impact, given that in the balanced panel we exclude those individuals who have been out of work before and/or after the implementation of the policy, for any reason. For the private company this means we exclude, among others, those who had been fired.
The two tables report the Barghava-Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated residuals. The test cannot reject the hypothesis that the residuals do not follow a AR(1) process (lower bound of the DW test when k=21 number of regressors and high number of observations is equal to 1.906. The value of our test is 1.74 which is lower than the lower bound, i.e. we cannot reject the null of uncorrelated residuals). The Breusch-Pagan test for random effects always rejects the hypothesis that the variance of the individual effects is zero.
As far as individual characteristics, women tend to be more absence-prone than men. Age and tenure have both a positive impact on (log)number of absence days. But it seems to be a non linear trend in tenure, meaning that after a certain level of seniority, absence is higher. Higher job positions are associated with less absenteeism. Working in the North West and North East areas is negatively correlated with absence with respect to working in the Centre or South. 
Conclusions
This paper investigates the effects of Law 133/2008 and the shocks occurred after the changes in the law itself. We observe long run trends in the public and private sectors with data on total employment sickness leaves in the public sector (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato) and the fiscal government institution (Agenzia delle Entrate) as well as in the private sector yearly data from ISTAT and Assolombarda. Public and private sectors follow a similar stable path with the public sector consistently higher before the law, but there has been a declining path in both sectors after 2007. The cost of opportunistic behaviour in the Italian private sector may be a job loss or slower/no career. In the public enterprise, the cost of opportunistic behaviour is a reduction in earnings which cuts the base salary. Employment protection legislation in Italy restricts the hiring and firing of workers, but much more in the public than in the private sector. The seniority-based lay-off rule makes the public sector a very stable employment protected from the business cycle. Due to the availability of micro data on one public institution (AE) and a private service sector, we are able to describe the behaviour of employees over time and individual characteristics. We notice a sharp decline in absenteeism after 2007 (the time span of interest in this paper) both in duration of sickness leaves and frequency of episodes over the semesters, and a shift of preference from high frequency absences to low frequency absences (people tend to take fewer leaves). We implement a difference-in-differences type of model to evaluate the effectiveness of Law 133/2008 on absenteeism of the public institution workers, compared to the behaviour of workers of the private company. The average treatment effect of the policy on public employees is negative and statistically significant. After the III quarter 2009, the negative trend turns positive, employees increased their absence days again. Demographic and professional characteristics of the sample workers are significantly correlated with sickness absence. Women tend to take more absence days, while married individuals do not. Age and tenure are positively correlated with sickness absence, but tenure shows a non linear relationship. Finally, higher level positions in the firm are negatively correlated with sickness absence.
